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ABSTRACT 
The debate on personal identity has profoundly modified the approach to the analysis of 
prudence, its structure and its links with rationality and morality. While in ethics of 18th 
and 19th centuries the problem of justifying prudent behaviour rationally did not exist, 
in contemporary ethics it seems no longer possible to justify it rationally. Particularly, 
from the perspective of the complex account of personal identity it seems that the only 
way to condemn great imprudence is from the point of view of morality. In this way we 
assist to a slow erosion of the clear-cut distinction between prudence and morality. The 
paper illustrates this change contrasting the analysis of prudence made by Joseph But-
ler, and then followed by his heir Henry Sidgwick, with that recently made by Derek 
Parfit. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The recent debate on personal identity has profoundly modified the ap-
proach to the analysis of prudence, its structure and its links with altruism 
and moral theory. In contemporary thinking we witness a slow erosion of 
the clear-cut categorical distinction between egoism and altruism character-
istic of the philosophical framework of the English 18th century1. 
In 18th century ethics, in which the problem of rationally justifying pru-
dent behaviour did not exist, a particularly urgent need was felt to find a 
solution to the issue involving the possibility of accepting prudence from the 
specifically moral standpoint. If prudence is to be considered as a com-
pletely self-interested line of behaviour and, according to the thesis prevail-
ing at the time, the moral point of view may be identified with an impartial 
and disinterested outlook, the question naturally arose of whether prudence 
could be reconciled, and in what way, with the need for morally virtuous 
behaviour. 
With reference to this problem, the project of Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson, in which it was claimed that a comparatively clear-cut differ-
ence existed between prudence and moral virtue, was opposed by the con-
                                                  
1 For a reconstruction of the relationship between prudence and ethics within the frame-
work of 18th century English philosophy and the changes wrought in contemporary 
thinking see Eugenio Lecaldano, L’etica e l’identità personale: tra prudenza e azione razi-
onale, Archivio di filosofia, LV n. 1-3-, pp. 231-259. 
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ciliatory proposal of Butler, and Smith, in which prudence was deemed to be 
a behaviour that did not clash with moral virtue, without however coincid-
ing with it. 
For our purpose it is important to point out that, even those who were in-
clined to believe a relatively strong degree of reconciliation was possible be-
tween ethical behaviour and prudence accepted the general thesis that it 
was possible to make a categorical distinction between these two levels of 
behaviour: egoistic actions motivated by self-interest ought not to be con-
fused with altruistic or moral actions guided by benevolence. 
The distinction between egoism and altruism, and consequently between 
prudence and ethics, albeit in a radically different philosophical context to 
that of utilitarianism, is not discussed in the English tradition in a book 
written in the late nineteenth century such as Methods of Ethics2 by H. 
Sidgwick. And it is precisely this distinction that leads to what Sidgwick 
considers the most difficult problem facing ethics: the dualism of the practi-
cal reason, that is, the serious and profound contradiction between two ethi-
cal principles, that of rational egoism and that of rational benevolence, due 
to the simultaneous validity of two rational normative intuitions of equal 
weight and strength. 
In contemporary philosophy we witness a shift in the axis of thinking re-
garding the relations between prudence and ethics versus both the 18th cen-
tury framework and the theses expressed in the Methods. In addition to the 
problem of the rationality of ethics, the need is felt to raise the increasingly 
fundamental question of the rationality of prudence. 
The turning point is represented by the huge success encountered in re-
cent years by several ideas contained in the treatment of prudence and ra-
tional egoism given by Sidgwick in his Methods. In one argument, known in 
contemporary philosophy as the “parity argument”3, Sidgwick describes the 
difficulty of considering the point of view of rational egoism fully justified 
and evident as compared with that of altruism. He writes: 
 
From the point of view, indeed, of abstract philosophy, I do not see why the 
Egoist principle should pass unchallenged any more than the Univeralistic. 
I do not see why the axiom of Prudence should not be questioned, when it 
conflicts with present inclination, on a ground similar to that on which Ego-
ists refuse to admit the axiom of Rational Benevolence. If the Utilitarian 
has to answer to the question, ‘Why should I sacrifice my own happiness for 
                                                  
2 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (1874, 7th ed. 1907), Indianapolis, Ind., Hack-
ett, 1981. 
3 This term was introduced by D.O. Brink in Sidgwick and the Rationale for Rational Ego-
ism, in B. Schultz (ed.), Essays on Henry Sidgwick, New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 1991, pp. 199-239. 
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the greater happiness of another?’ it must surely be admissible to ask the 
Egoist, ‘Why should I sacrifice a present pleasure for a greater one in the fu-
ture? Why should I concern myself about my own future feelings any more 
than about the feelings of other persons?’ It undoubtedly seems to Common 
Sense paradoxical to ask for a reason why one should seek one’s own happi-
ness on the whole; but I do not see how the demand can be repudiated as 
absurd by those who adopt the views of the estreme empirical school of psy-
chologists, although those views are commonly supposed to have a close af-
finity with Egoistic Hedonism. Grant that the Ego is merely a system of co-
herent phenomena, that the permanent identical ‘I’ is not a fact but a fic-
tion, as Hume and his followers maintain; why, then, should one part of the 
series of feelings into which the Ego is resolved be concerned with another 
part of the same series, any more than with any other series?4 
 
In this well-known passage, Sidgwick emphasizes the need to provide ar-
guments in support of prudence, and explained how the demand for these 
arguments derived from an analysis of the structure of prudence involving 
both its dimension of temporal neutrality and the implications of a complex 
or atomistic conception of the self. Sidgwick’s approach, recently taken up 
again by authors like T. Nagel5, R.M. Hare6 and D. Parfit7 by means of a 
further scrutiny of the conditions of prudent action, led to a reappraisal of 
the general question of the relationship between ethics and prudence. 
The most significant results within this new analytical paradigm have 
been achieved by Derek Parfit. Following in Sidgwick’s footsteps he recon-
structs prudence as a theory of individual rationality, which he calls “Self-
interest Theory” or S. S theory states that each agent must maximize his 
overall happiness, taking into consideration the probable total duration of 
his own life. From the content of this substantive objective it implicitly fol-
lows that each type of temporal preference must be considered irrational as 
the agents are asked to have an equal interest in all parts of their lives. Par-
fit constructs two groups of objections to the self-interest theory, reaching 
the conclusion that the substantive objective of this theory requires the 
agents to adopt an attitude vis-à-vis their own future that has no rational 
justification: the theory must therefore be rejected. 
The outcome of these arguments thus shows that, in accordance with the 
classical theory of prudence, we can no longer consider imprudent actions as 
                                                  
4 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, pp. 418-19. 
5 Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1970. 
6 R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking. Its Levels, Methods and Point, New York, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1981. 
7 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984. 
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irrational since prudence does not prescribe rational actions. We therefore 
need a new theory that, by adopting a different criterion of rationality, will 
allow us to condemn imprudent actions. 
Parfit believes that the only available strategy is to modify our ethical 
theory in such a way as to extend its application also to the class of impru-
dent actions which were conventionally not subject to moral evaluation. 
This article thus focuses on the examination of the outcomes of the main 
arguments developed by Parfit to refute the “Self-interest Theory”. 
Furthermore, it will be attempted to demonstrate why the only valid ar-
gument among those presented in Reasons and Persons, is the one based on a 
revised conception of personal identity, thereby confirming our idea to con-
sider Parfit’s work as an essential part of the new analytical paradigm that 
has brought about a change in the relationship between prudence and eth-
ics. 
Before analysing the structure of the theory of self-interest and its pecu-
liar features as a theory of rationality, I should like to examine briefly sev-
eral classical treatments of prudence in the English philosophical thinking. 
In particular, I shall take into consideration the discussion Butler provides 
of “reasonable self-love” in the first few chapters of his Fifteen Sermons 
Preached at Rolls Chapel (1726)8, as well as the more systematic treatment of 
“rational egoism” given by Sidgwick in Book II of his Methods of Ethics. In 
my view, these two works provide the most complete analysis of prudence in 
British philosophy. They show that in the past there was no problem in jus-
tifying this line of behaviour as it was deemed perfectly rational. Moreover, 
Butler’s and Sidgwick’s analysis shows that Parfit’s self-interest theory has 
the same structural features as the classical theory of prudence and there-
fore to reject S amounts to rejecting the classical theory. It is of vital impor-
tance to emphasize these similarities: only in this way is it possible to claim 
that Parfit’s arguments refute the classical theory of prudence and therefore 
legitimize this author’s historical importance. 
 
 
2. Butler’s “reasonable self-love” 
 
The most detailed treatment by Butler of the topic of prudence is contained 
in his most important work on ethics, the Fifteen Sermons Preached at Rolls 
Chapel, first published in 1726, and republished in a second edition with an 
important new preface in 1729. 
                                                  
8 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel (1726), with introduction, 
analyses, and notes by the Very Rev. W. R. Matthews, London, G. Bell & Dons LTD, 
1967. 
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Butler’s Sermons are presented as a treatment of interconnected topics 
and arguments mainly of ethical nature that have however often been de-
veloped unsystematically and are therefore hard to interpret. 
Before making a direct examination of Butler’s conception of “reasonable 
self-love” let us make a schematic overview of his conception of human na-
ture, within which this doctrine is situated. 
 
 
2.1. The conception of human nature 
 
The importance of investigating the notion of human nature in the recon-
struction of Butler’s fundamental ethical theses is underlined by the author 
himself in the Preface to his Sermons: 
 
They were intended to explain what is meant by the nature of man, when it 
is said that virtue consists in following, and vice in deviating from it; and by 
explaining to show that the assertion is true.9 
 
In the same Preface, Butler tells us that the principle according to which 
virtue lies in following nature is a very old one and has its origin in the ethi-
cal reflections of Stoic thinking. This principle, which the author believes 
still to be valid, requires a different proof from that which has been given in 
the past in which its psychological implications rather than its metaphysical 
implications are highlighted. In Sermons I, II, III and XI, Butler is engaged 
in the reconstruction of a conception of human nature on the basis of which 
virtuous behaviour is the only behaviour fully compliant with man’s true 
constitution. 
According to Butler, human nature consists of a plethora of internal prin-
ciples that can easily be distinguished from each other, in spite of the phi-
losophers’ tendency to confuse them: 
 
Mankind has various instincts and principles of action, as brute creatures 
have; some leading most directly and immediately to the good of the com-
munity, and some most directly to private good. 
Man has several which brutes have not; particularly reflection or con-
science, an approbation of some principles or actions, and disapprobation of 
others.10 
 
                                                  
9 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, Pref., p. 7. 
10 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, Pref., p. 12. 
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The term “principle” is the most commonly noun used by Butler to refer 
indifferently to any internal source of human action. According to Butler’s 
analysis, among the practical principles, it is important to make the distinc-
tion between “particular affections, appetites and passions” and “principle 
or general affection of self-love”, and between the latter and the “natural 
principle” of benevolence. In addition to these elements it is possible to 
identify a principle of reflection which is used by mankind to express moral 
approval or disapproval of their actions, which Butler calls “conscience”. 
Self-love is identified with a general affection that urges us to act in con-
formity with our happiness; the general character of its object differentiates 
it from the other particular affections. It is also a rational principle, as it 
implies a capacity to distinguish between our present desires and our overall 
well-being. For the time being we shall not dwell on the analysis of this af-
fection, to which the following section will be devoted. 
The meaning Butler attributes to the principle of benevolence is more 
problematic. The status of this affection has caused a divergence among his 
commentators. The fundamental issue is whether this is a general principle, 
distinct from particular passions, or whether instead the term “benevo-
lence” is simply a general term that refers indifferently to all the particular 
desires that have the welfare of others as their object11. It is beyond our pre-
sent scope to clarify the different positions related to this problem. In 
agreement with T. Penelhum12, I shall assume that the principle of benevo-
lence must be interpreted as the “love of our neighbour”. Benevolence is 
therefore a general desire whose object is not universal good but only the 
good of “that part of mankind, that part of our country, which comes under 
our immediate notice, acquaintance and influence, and with which we have 
to do”.13 Butler stresses that this general affection is also a rational princi-
ple: it actually demands the capacity to distinguish in others their short-
term satisfactions from their long-term good. 
The last principle identified in human nature by Butler is conscience. 
Unlike benevolence and self-love, conscience is not an affection. Butler pre-
sents it as “a principle of reflection in men, by which they distinguish be-
                                                  
11 For a detailed discussion of this problem see Terence Penelhum, Butler, London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985. For a comparison of Butler’s views on benevolence with 
those of Hutcheson and Hume see T. A. Roberts, The Concept of Benevolence, London, 
Macmillan, 1973; see also Amelie Rorty, Butler on Benevolence and Conscience, “Philoso-
phy” 53 (1978), pp. 171-181. For a recent and extended study of Butler’s ethics, see 
Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, chap. 9. 
12 See Terence Penelhum, Butler, pp. 31-35. 
13 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, Serm. XII, 3, pp. 186-187. 
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tween, approve and disapprove, their own actions”.14 The language used by 
Butler suggests that conscience is the only faculty by means of which hu-
man beings reflect on their own nature and on the practical principles and 
actions that comply with it. However, if what has been stated is correct, it 
is obvious that also self-love and benevolence demand a certain capacity for 
reflection as, in order to function correctly, each requires an awareness ei-
ther of one’s own nature and one’s own needs or of that of the others and 
their needs. Therefore, while it is true that conscience must have a distinc-
tive nature, this nature must reside in that special way in which it exerts its 
reflective power. In Sermon I, Butler strongly emphasizes that the distinc-
tive nature of its judgments depends on the form they take on: namely, that 
of approval or disapproval. Conscience is therefore that faculty by means of 
which we approve or disapprove of our actions and the practical principle 
through which we act. In this sense, conscience can bridle self-love and be-
nevolence when they lead us to perform actions that, in spite of our inten-
tions, are contrary to our long-term interests and those of others. 
The author of the Sermons believes that the empirical evidence in support 
of the presence of these principles in human nature is sufficient per se to 
demonstrate that human beings are not only liable to neglect the interests of 
others, but may also neglect their own. In this sense, promoting the good of 
others could be in agreement with the constitution of human nature to the 
same extent as acting to pursue one’s own personal good. 
However, even if this were sufficient to demonstrate that virtuous actions 
are to some extent compliant with human nature, it does not amount to 
claiming that virtue is compliant with our nature in a way that vice is not. 
To support this thesis it is necessary to attribute a well-defined meaning to 
the notion of “following nature”. Butler lists three possibilities. It may be 
done by acting in compliance with one of the internal principles; or else sim-
ply by following the principle that, at some particular moment in time, has 
greater force than the others; lastly, we may follow our nature, acting in a 
way that is compliant with our entire constitution. Butler believes that only 
in the latter meaning it is possible to defend the thesis that virtue is compli-
ant with human nature. 
What does the concept of “entire constitution” of human nature refer to? 
In Butler’s conception, human nature, unlike that of the other animals, is 
organized in such a way that its principles have a superiority over particular 
inclinations which differs from that deriving from the simple intensity of the 
motivating force: their superiority is due to their status. Acting unnaturally 
simply means following a particular affection that one of the superior prin-
ciples under those particular circumstances would ask us not to follow. 
                                                  
14 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, Serm. I, 8, p. 38. 
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Butler illustrates the point by referring to the unnaturalness of those ac-
tions we perform when we are in the sway of a violent desire, even though 
we know it will lead us to our doom: 
 
Now what is it which renders such a rash action unnatural? Is it that he 
went against the principle of reasonable and cool self-love, considered merely 
as a part of nature? No: for if he had acted the contrary way, he would 
equally have gone against a principle or part of his nature, namely, passion 
or appetite. But to deny a present appetite, from foresight that the gratifi-
cation of it would end in immediate ruin or extreme misery, is by no means 
an unnatural action: whereas to contradict or go against cool self-love for 
the sake of such gratification, is so in the instance before us. Such an action 
then being unnatural; and its being so not arising from a man’s going 
against a principle or desire barely, nor in going against that principle or de-
sire which happens for the present to be strongest … There must be some 
other difference or distinction to be made between these two principles, pas-
sion and cool self-love, than what I have yet taken notice of. And this dif-
ference, not being a difference in strength or degree, I call a difference in na-
ture and in kind. And since, in the instance still before us, if passion prevails 
over self love, the consequent action is unnatural; but if self-love prevails 
over passion, the action is natural: it is manifest that self-love is in human 
nature a superior principle to passion. This may be contradicted without 
violating that nature; but the former cannot. So that, if we will act con-
formably to the economy of man’s nature, reasonable self-love must govern. 
Thus … we may have a clear conception of the superior nature of one inward 
principle to another; and see that there really is this natural superiority, 
quite distinct from degrees of strength and prevalency.15 
 
As Butler emphasizes in this passage, the question at stake in the case of 
the unnaturalness of  serious rashness is whether to satisfy this impulse un-
der those circumstances is contrary to the dictates of “self-love”, a practical 
principle that, in accordance with the hierarchical structure of human na-
ture, exerts its authority over any present inclination. 
Butler claims that conscience has a supreme authority over all the other 
practical principles. In this sense, it may be claimed that acting against 
one’s nature means following a lesser principle rather than the authority of 
conscience. 
The doctrine of the natural authority of conscience is Butler’s best known 
contribution to ethical theory, even though it is the one that caused his in-
terpreters the greatest difficulty. In particular, it is not clear to what extent 
                                                  
15 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, Serm. II, 11, pp. 55-56. 
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the superiority of the conscience demands behaviour that may clash with 
the prescriptions of self love. In several passages, indeed, Butler seems to 
accept the thesis that moral virtue coincides with our own interests, if not 
actually to defend the much stronger thesis that to follow the dictates of 
conscience is justified solely by the fact that self love prescribes the same 
course of action. 
 
 
2.2. “Reasonable self love” and particular affections 
 
Before going on to analyse the specific nature of the self-love principle and 
the differences between it and particular affections, it is necessary to make a 
few further considerations regarding Butler’s moral psychology. 
Butler claims that to have an affection means having a particular goal, 
and that such a goal must be considered the object of that affection: 
 
Now, as reason tends to and rests in the discernment of truth, the object of 
it; so the very nature of affection consists in tending towards, and resting in, 
its objects as an end. … If we have no affections which rest in what are 
called their objects, then what is called affection, love, desire, hope, in hu-
man nature, is only an uneasiness in being at rest; an unquiet disposition to 
action, progress, pursuit, without end or meaning.16 
 
The notion of the object of an affection thus finds its primary use in those 
cases in which the affection concerned has a particular aim or objective. The 
paradigmatic cases are presumably those in which the latter is a desire, of 
which appetites are special cases17. Other possible examples could be those 
of passions that are not desires, such as anger, resentment or compassion, in 
which however the psychological state under scrutiny is itself logically 
linked to the desire to do good or evil to someone. 
The notion of the object of an affection allows us to appreciate the differ-
ence between particular impulses and self love. In his Preface to Sermons, 
Butler introduces the self-love principle, contrasting it with affections. The 
true contrast, however, is not with affections as such but with the particular 
nature of their objects. Self love is a general principle, not a special one; its 
general nature derives from its specific object, namely, happiness, or the 
long-term good of the subject. Butler writes: 
 
                                                  
16 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, Serm. XIII, 5, pp. 206-7. 
17 According to Butler’s terminology, appetites are desires related to physical survival or 
well-being: such as hunger, thirst or sexual desire. 
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[…] private happiness or good is all which self-love can make us desire, or be 
concerned about: in having this consists its gratification; it is an affection to 
ourselves; a regard to our own interest, happiness and private good: and in 
the proportion a man hath this, he is interested, or a lover of himself […].18 
 
Butler does not dwell at length on discussing what happiness represents 
for human beings; this is probably due to the general nature of self love, 
which excludes too precise an understanding of its object. 
 
Happiness or satisfaction consists only in the enjoyment of those objects, 
which are by nature suited to our several particular appetites, passions and 
affections.19 
 
Whatever the particular choices of each person that lead to happiness, a 
happy life will be one in which the majority of particular appetites and pas-
sions are satisfied in the long term. 
The partial characterization of happiness provided by Butler helps clarify 
the status of self love. As several scholars have emphasized, the latter is a 
second order practical principle: that is, it is a desire to satisfy several de-
sires and for certain objects of aversion to be removed in the long term.20 
According to Butler, from this characterization it certainly emerges that 
self love is an affection; indeed it is a desire, although it may also be inferred 
that it is a rational principle. There are two reasons for this. First, self love 
demands the capacity to distinguish between a second order general object, 
such as the overall happiness of the individual, and the particular objects of 
passions. Second, since it may be exercised only through the judgment that 
particular objects will contribute to a certain extent to the general object of 
self love, it implies both the capacity to predict the effects of satisfying the 
various desires and the ability to calculate and compare the hedonic inten-
sity associated with this satisfaction. Butler stresses the rational dimension 
of this principle by calling it “calm self love” and “reasonable self love”. The 
rationality of prudent behaviour is highlighted also by the adjectives Butler 
uses to criticize those who are unable to achieve it: madness is often attrib-
uted precisely to those persons who are unable to master the complexity of 
their temporal existence, that is, who fail to compare several different satis-
factions in separate times among themselves. 
Butler also claims that it is precisely from the difficulty involved in 
achieving this line of behaviour that it follows that prudence is a virtue. In-
                                                  
18 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, Serm. XI, 8, p. 169. 
19 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, Serm. XI, 9, p. 170. 
20 T. Penelhum, Butler, chap. 1. 
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deed, insofar as it represents that reasonable self love, whose goal is our in-
terest, prudence certainly does not coincide with immediate and particular 
passions. It requires the capacity to achieve proper behaviour in temporal 
matters: that is, to assess the consequences of one’s actions beyond their 
more immediate effects, avoiding all actions based solely on the attainment 
of momentary satisfaction and, in Butler’s words, not to fall into the error 
of forgoing a greater temporal good for a lesser one, that is, forgoing what is 
in our overall interest for the sake of momentary satisfaction. 
 
 
2.3. “Reasonable self love” and psychological egoism 
 
I want now to subject to further analysis the peculiar characteristics of the 
conception of prudence or the “reasonable self love” described by Butler, 
highlighting the differences between it and the doctrine of psychological 
egoism. 
Psychological egoism is a thesis asserting that all actions are motivated 
by personal interest21. Two characteristics emerge from this highly sche-
matic and general presentation. Psychological egoism is a thesis describing 
human nature which sets out to be empirically informative. Furthermore, 
this thesis is universal since it is aimed at characterizing the motives of all 
agents in all circumstances of action. It follows from the conjunction of 
these two characteristics that the conception in question might be refuted 
empirically. 
Butler interprets the conception of psychological egoism using the lan-
guage of his moral psychology: on the basis of his description, this concep-
tion asserts that all actions are performed under the influence of the affec-
tion of self love, that is, all motives can be reduced to the pursuit of one’s 
own happiness. Such a theory has dangerous moral implications as it denies 
the existence of genuinely altruistic motivations. In his Sermon XI Butler 
will demonstrate how this doctrine must be rejected; it actually fails to 
stand up to  the test of experience. 
The first objection to psychological egoism asserts that this conception 
may be defended only on the basis of an erroneous interpretation of the 
genuine doctrine of self love. Acting in accordance with “reasonable self 
                                                  
21 Psychological hedonism may be considered a special case of this thesis; it reduces all 
our motives to a desire for pleasure. In Sermon XI Butler devotes ample space to refut-
ing this conception. It is due to two confused inferences: (1) the first infers from the fact 
that all my motives are mine the conclusion that the object of my desires must always be 
an internal state of mine, (ii) the second infers from the fact that I usually obtain pleas-
ure from the satisfaction of my desires that my desires are always directed towards my 
own pleasure. 
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love”, as already emphasized previously, means pursuing those lines of ac-
tion the effects of which will presumably contribute to the overall happiness 
of the person. However, this in no way implies that the actions are due di-
rectly to the desire for one’s own happiness. As mentioned earlier, the desire 
for happiness or personal well-being is a regulatory or second-order desire, 
the task of which is to ensure the best possible mix of satisfaction of one’s 
particular passions. The normal function of this desire thus seems to be to 
approve or disapprove of particular desires in proportion to their capacity 
to contribute to the agent’s overall happiness. It follows that this general 
desire cannot be a substitute for the function performed by the specific de-
sires that are the direct cause of the actions. It seems quite apparent that, 
on the basis of this explanation of how self love can and should function, it 
is possible to come up with an immediate refutation of the doctrine of psy-
chological egoism. Butler infers two different critiques from this. 
First, it is possible to reject the thesis that our sole motivation is always 
the pursuit of happiness as a whole. Indeed on the basis of the explanation 
given above it follows that, in those circumstances in which we act in a fash-
ion compliant with self love, there is an additional motive that the pursuit 
of one’s own happiness encourages or at least allows to be satisfied. Butler 
points out how, in certain particular circumstances, it is actually possible 
that the pursuit of our own good is the only motive. On those occasions on 
which we refrain from doing something we actually desire because, for ex-
ample, we deem it to be contrary to our interests, Butler asserts that self 
love is probably the only principle acting. However, these circumstances are 
rare and cannot be used as a suitable foundation for a universal theory of 
human motivation. Second, it is possible to reject the assumption, shared by 
many forms of psychological egoism, according to which the self love doc-
trine is incompatible with the existence of altruistic actions motivated by 
desires for the good of others. The essence of the discussion again hinges on 
the possibility of distinguishing self love and particular passions on the basis 
of their objects. As we saw, Butler claims that the objects specific to par-
ticular passions are particular desired objects or events, such as for example 
my lunch, a home, a holiday, etc. According to this distinction, he claims 
that although we might not be able to pursue happiness without first decid-
ing whether our particular desires contribute to its attainment, we could act 
under the impulse of a particular desire without considering whether it con-
tributes to our happiness. Once this corollary has been accepted there is no 
contradiction in imagining that the particular desires may include desires 
that contribute indirectly to the well-being of others, or actually have the 
good of others as their specific object. Whether these desires contribute to 
our happiness is a question that may be answered only through the very ex-
ercise of self love and to which no a priori answer may be given. But we can 
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thus conclude that desires for the good of others are not in principle more 
incompatible with self love than any other particular desire. 
Butler’s second argument is based on the observation that the substan-
tive objective of self love, namely happiness, is attained more easily if we do 
not act under its impulse. He points out that in many circumstances we are 
better able to satisfy our happiness by not considering whether and to what 
extent what we wish to do contributes to it since the calculation of one’s ad-
vantages can be an impediment precisely to those activities demanded by 
happiness: 
 
Disengagement is absolutely necessary to enjoyment: and a person may have 
so steady and fixed an eye upon his own interest , whatever he places it in, 
as may hinder him from attending to many gratifications within his reach, 
which others have their minds free and open to.22 
 
In this passage Butler points out that enjoyment is a form of attention 
and reflecting on self love may be a distraction. This is how he explains the 
fact that the persons who are always busy calculating their happiness are 
often unhappier than the others. 
This refutation of psychological egoism has the merit of highlighting sev-
eral important aspects of the theory of “reasonable self love”. It actually 
shows not only that altruistic desires are not incompatible with the pursuit 
of one’s own happiness but, more in general, sheds light on the risks linked 
to the adoption of a constant inclination to calculate the different satisfac-
tions involved, which could lead to less satisfactory outcomes from the point 
of view of overall personal happiness itself. 
 
 
3. “Egoistic hedonism” in Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics 
 
The idea that “calm self love” must be considered a normative principle, as 
it prescribes that individuals should pursue their overall happiness by pro-
hibiting the satisfaction of those present inclinations which may prove det-
rimental in the long term, is picked up again by Henry Sidgwick in his 
Methods of Ethics. He includes “rational egoism”23 among the methods of 
ethics, that is, among the rational procedures used by human beings to gov-
ern their behaviour whenever they seek to work out a complete synthesis of 
practical maxims. 
                                                  
22 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, Serm. XI, 9, p. 171. 
23 Following Sidgwick’s use, the terms “egoistic hedonism” and “rational egoism” will be 
considered synonymous. 
 
 Prudence and Morality in Butler, Sidgwick, and Parfit 
 
 85 
The inclusion of “rational egoism” among the methods of ethics will lead 
to the failure of the foundationalist project of ethics which represented one 
of the principal objectives of the Methods. In the well-known chapter de-
voted to philosophical intuitionism, in which the cognitive intuitionist epis-
temological framework forming the background to his treatment is outlined, 
Sidgwick shows that two mutually incompatible principles underpin pru-
dence and benevolence, both of which are however self-evident: conse-
quently the egoist could coherently maintain his own position without it be-
ing possible to refute it rationally. 
Before presenting several of the characteristics of rational egoism, a few 
general considerations will be made concerning the philosophical project of 
the Methods. 
 
 
3.1. The objectives of the Methods of Ethics 
 
By the expression ‘method of ethics’ Sidgwick means any rational procedure 
by means of which it is possible to determine what human beings as single 
individuals must do. One of his strongest convictions is that common sense 
morality embodies different methods: 
 
Still I think that when a man seriously asks ‘why he should do’ anything, he 
commonly assumes in himself a determination to pursue whatever conduct 
may be shown by argument to be reasonable […] And we are generally 
agreed that reasonable conduct in any case has to be determined on princi-
ples […] But when we ask what these principles are, the diversity of answers 
which we find manifestly declared in the systems and fundamental formulae 
of professed moralists seems to be really present in the common practical 
reasoning of men generally […].24 
 
In Chapter 1 of Book 1, Sidgwick briefly discusses a variety of methods 
and principles which are linked in different ways and through different fac-
tual assumptions. More precisely, as J.B. Schneewind25 emphasizes, Sidg-
wick, by analysing human moral reasoning, had identified two types of 
methods of ethics: 1) methods logically linked to the ultimate principles, 
and 2) methods indirectly linked to the ultimate principles. A method logi-
cally linked to an ultimate principle requires the moral agent to identify the 
                                                  
24 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 6. 
25 Jerome B. Schneewind, Sidgwick Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy, Oxford, Clar-
endon Press, 1977, cap. 6, pp. 194-98. See also, J. Schneewind, Sidgwick and the Cam-
bridge Moralists, in Bart Schultz (ed.), Essay on Henry Sidgwick, pp. 93-121. 
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action to be performed exclusively through the only property that renders 
the actions right (right-making property). On the other hand, in a method 
indirectly linked to the ultimate principle, the moral agent identifies the ac-
tions to be performed not through the sole right-making property but by 
means of a characteristic linked to the latter through a contingent link (a 
criterial property). As Sidgwick himself asserts, his treatment was concerned 
solely with the “critical exposition of the different ‘methods’ … which are 
logically connected with the different ultimate reasons widely accepted”.26 
The reason for this restriction is probably to be sought in the fact that 
Sidgwick was aware that one of the main causes of disagreement among 
human beings concerning their specific moral judgments consists of the dif-
ferences related to their psychological, religious or metaphysical beliefs. By 
insisting on this restriction the moral philosopher was able to eliminate all 
the difficulties pertaining to realms of thinking that lay beyond the scope of 
ethics to investigate. 
Among the many methods that are cloaked in varying degrees in the am-
biguity of our moral  language, Sidgwick claims that the following three 
methods can be distinguished: “egoistic hedonism”, universalistic hedonism 
or utilitarianism, and intuitionism. He asserts the widely accepted common-
sense view that it is rational to act both for one’s private happiness as a 
whole and for the general happiness of all individuals. In this way it is easy 
to generate both the method of egoism and that of utilitarianism. 
The intuitionist method, unlike the other two, is not linked directly to an 
ultimate principle. For the sake of simplicity intuitionism could be defined 
as the theory of ethics which considers as the ultimate aim of moral actions 
their compliance with certain unconditionally prescribed rules or dictates, 
without any consideration of the further consequences. The use of the term 
“dictates” implies including in this method the position according to which 
the ultimately valid moral imperatives are those referring to particular acts. 
Sidgwick himself, in Chapter 8 of Book I, alerts the reader to the different 
meanings he will assign to the term intuitionism, where those differences are 
due to the different generality of the intuitive beliefs recognized as ulti-
mately valid. 
The three methods analysed in Methods are not examined historically, as 
they are decision-making procedures that have effectively been proposed to 
govern everyday conduct, seeking to identify the changes that have come 
about over the centuries. Rather they are analysed insofar as, at least to the 
extent to which they are not mutually reconcilable, they represent alterna-
tives from which human thought seems necessarily obliged to choose when 
                                                  
26 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 78. 
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it seeks to work out a complete synthesis of the practical maxims by striv-
ing to act in a perfectly consistent manner. 
If, as it is often the case, the different common-sense methods applied in 
concrete circumstances provide mutually conflicting prescriptions, not all of 
them are acceptable: 
 
[…] whereas the philosopher seeks unity of principle, and consistency of 
method at the risk of paradox, the unphilosophic man is apt to hold differ-
ent principles at once, and to apply different methods in more or less con-
fused combination […]. For if there are different views of the ultimate rea-
sonableness of conduct, implicit in the thought of ordinary men, though not 
brought into clear relation to each other […] we cannot, of course, regard as 
valid reasonings that lead to conflicting conclusions; and I therefore assume 
as a fundamental postulate of Ethics, that so far as two methods conflict, 
one or other of them must be modified or rejected.27 
 
Much of book IV of Methods is devoted to the attempt to harmonize and 
reduce to unity the different methods of ethics. However, I should like to 
point out that in the present article, in view of the objectives illustrated 
above, I shall not take into consideration the successful reconciliation be-
tween intuitionism and utilitarianism; instead, in view of the reconciliation 
between these two methods, I shall dwell on the problems raised by the at-
tempt to seek a synthesis between utilitarianism and “rational egoism”. Be-
fore directly addressing the problems linked to the relationship between 
these two methods, it is necessary to say something about the specific char-
acteristics of “rational egoism”. 
 
 
3.2. “Egoistic hedonism” 
 
Sidgwick devotes book two of Methods to the examination of “egoistic he-
donism”. He defines “egoism” as a method for determining the reasonable 
behaviour whereby each individual is supposed to adopt personal happiness 
as his own exclusive goal. Right from the outset, Sidgwick is aware of the 
innovative nature of the assumptions on which his investigation is based: 
 
It may be doubted whether this ought to be included among received 
“methods of Ethics”; since there are strong grounds for holding that a sys-
                                                  
27 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 6. 
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tem of morality, satisfactory to the moral consciousness of mankind in gen-
eral, cannot be constructed on the basis of simple Egoism.28 
 
He nevertheless deems it easy to dispose of this objection based on com-
mon-sense assertions that the principle has been widely accepted that it is 
reasonable for men to act in the way more likely to lead to their personal 
happiness: 
 
Indeed, it is hardly going too far to say that common sense assumes that 
‘interested’ actions, tending to promote the agent’s happiness, are prima fa-
cie reasonable: and that the onus probandi lies with those who maintain that 
disinterested conduct, as such, is reasonable.29 
 
According to the definition proposed by Sidgwick, it is necessary to define 
as egoistic the agent that, when faced with several possible lines of action, 
ascertains as accurately as possible the amount of pleasure and pain that is 
likely to result from each action and chooses the one which she believes will 
bring her the greatest happiness. The quantitative characterization of the 
rational goal of egoistic conduct deserves further clarification. The notion of 
the greatest possible happiness cannot be fully understood unless the mean-
ing of “good on the whole” is clarified. A person’s “good on the whole” is 
what she would desire and seek to achieve if she had fully understood all the 
consequences of all lines of conduct available to her. As Sidgwick percep-
tively points out, it is a terrible error to define a person’s good simply as 
what would be desired if the outcomes of a given action could be predicted. 
It might always be possible that the choice of a particular object, while not 
emerging as an apparent good, that is, not different from what had been 
imagined, could on the whole be a bad choice owing to the concomitant as-
pects and long-term consequences. Sidgwick asserts that: 
 
For it is not even sufficient to say that my Good on the whole is what I 
should actually desire and seek if all the consequences of seeking it could be 
foreknown and adequately realized by me in imagination at the time of 
making my choice. No doubt an equal regard for all the moments of our 
conscious experience – so far, at least, as the mere difference of their posi-
tion in time is concerned – is an essential characteristic of rational conduct. 
But the mere fact, that a man does not afterwards feel for the consequences 
of an action aversion strong enough to cause him to regret it, cannot be ac-
cepted as a complete proof that he has acted for his ‘good on the whole’. In-
                                                  
28 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p.119. 
29 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 120. 
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deed, we commonly reckon it among the worst consequences of some kinds 
of conduct that they alter men’s tendencies to desire, and make them desire 
their lesser good more than their greater […].30 
 
Sidgwick claims that the principle prescribing that “one ought to aim at 
one’s good on the whole”31 must be considered as the self-evident intuition 
that underlies the “rational egoism” method. This principle is seen to be 
immediately self-evident when we consider individual goods of the person as 
similar parts of a quantitative or mathematical complex. In this perspec-
tive, the values of the individual goods will be assigned solely from the point 
of view of her maximum overall good, and the importance assigned to an 
individual good will be no greater than that which it has in the economy of 
her overall good. In other words, this principle states that a person must 
have an impartial interest for all parts of her conscious life. Of course, Sidg-
wick does not mean that a present good cannot reasonably be preferred to a 
future good on the strength of its greater certainty; he merely means to af-
firm that the mere difference of priority and posterity in time “is not a rea-
sonable ground for having more regard to the consciousness of one moment 
that to that of another”.32 
Given Sidgwick’s eudemonistic or hedonistic interpretation of the good, 
the principle of prudence may be expressed by stating that it is reasonable 
to forgo a present pleasure or present happiness in return for greater future 
pleasure or happiness or, more simply, that “a smaller present good is not to 
be preferred to a greater future good”.33 
From the foregoing the normative nature of the “egoistic hedonism” 
method emerges clearly: it consists in restricting a present desire in the wake 
of predictions of the more distant consequences deriving from such gratifi-
cation. 
The entire first chapter of book II is devoted to clarifying the notions of 
“interest” and “happiness”, terms that in the author’s opinion are too vague 
and ambiguous to be used in a scientific discussion on ethics. Sidgwick de-
fines the notion of “greatest possible Happiness” as the “greatest attainable 
surplus of pleasure over pain”34, where the term pleasure is used in its 
broader acceptance which includes all kinds of agreeable feelings: “ the most 
refined and subtle intellectual and emotional gratifications, no less than the 
coarser and more definite sensual enjoyments”35. Acceptance of this quanti-
                                                  
30 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 111. 
31 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 381. 
32 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 381. 
33 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 381. 
34 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 120. 
35 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 127. 
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tative definition of the aim of egoism would imply that pleasures must be 
sought in proportion to their pleasantness, in such a way that the less pleas-
ant state of consciousness cannot be preferred to the more pleasant state 
simply because the latter possesses some other qualities. 
This conception of pleasure, which revisits Bentham’s thesis of the com-
plete homogeneity of pleasurable states of consciousness, completely con-
tradicted the idea, defended by John Stuart Mill in his Utilitarianism36, that 
it is possible to make a clear-cut distinction between qualitatively superior 
and qualitatively inferior pleasures. Sidgwick remarks: 
 
This position, however, seems to many offensively paradoxical; and J. S. 
Mill in his development of Bentham’s doctrine thought it desirable to aban-
don it and to take into account differences in quality among pleasures as 
well as differences in degree.37 
 
According to Mill, differences in value between lower and higher pleasures 
were an “unquestionable fact”38. Sidgwick believed that the outlook de-
fended by Mill could be accepted only if all the distinctions of quality could 
be resolved into considerations of quantity: 
 
Now here we may observe, first, that it is quite consistent with the view 
quoted as Bentham’s to describe some kinds of pleasure as inferior in qual-
ity to others, if by ‘a pleasure’ we mean (as is often meant) a whole state of 
consciousness which is only partly pleasurable; and still more if we take into 
view subsequent states. For many pleasures are not free from pain even 
while enjoyed; and many more have painful consequences. … and as the 
pain has to be set off as a drawback in valuing the pleasure, it is in accor-
dance with strictly quantitative measurement of pleasure to call them infe-
rior in kind.39 
 
Sidgwick also believed that if non-hedonistic reasons for the preference 
were introduced into the egoistic calculation it would no longer be possible 
to consider egoism an autonomous method of ethics. Should it be admitted 
that the quality of the pleasures must be considered as something distinct 
from their quantity, and that it could even prevail over them, “egoistic he-
donism” would no longer be clearly distinguishable from intuitionism. 
                                                  
36 John S. Mill, Utilitarianism (1861), edited by Roger Crisp, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1998, especially chap. 2. 
37 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p.94. 
38 John S. Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 56. 
39 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 94. 
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Before concluding this short reconstruction of the treatment of prudence 
as it appears in the Methods, I should like to examine what Sidgwick consid-
ered to be the difficulties implicit in the application of this method to cases 
of real conduct. 
The fundamental assumption underpinning this method, which is implicit 
in the idea of considering a greater surplus of pleasure over pain as the ulti-
mate aim of the conduct, is that all pleasures and all pains have a precise 
degree of positive or negative desirability which is knowable by the agents. 
Can it be assumed that in actual experience these degrees of desirability can 
be given with such precision? If this were false would it be a decisive objec-
tion to prudence? 
Another assumption is that our pleasures can be increased and our pain 
decreased by means of forecasting and calculation. Nevertheless, it could be 
claimed that the practice of observation and hedonistic calculation inevita-
bly tends to decrease our pleasures, at least the more important ones. It 
would thus seem problematic to try and attain our greatest happiness by at-
tempting to pursue it scientifically. 
Let us consider the latter objection first. Following Butler, Sidgwick af-
firms that it is possible to detect a difference between “extra-regarding” im-
pulses and those whose object is our pleasure.40 He also stresses that the 
greater part of our pleasure derives precisely from the satisfaction of those 
desires whose goals are different from pleasure itself.41 In view of these 
premises it is easy to imagine what implicit danger lurks in the attempt to 
systematize conduct according to the principle of egoism: impulse towards 
our own pleasure could absorb the mind to such a degree as to become in-
compatible with the flow of those disinterested impulses towards particular 
objects, the existence of which is necessary in order to attain to a high de-
gree that happiness toward which the principle of “egoistic hedonism” 
tends. This conclusion, which Sidgwick calls the “fundamental paradox of 
hedonism”, must not be considered a decisive argument against this 
method: 
 
I should not, however, infer from this that the pursuit of pleasure is neces-
sarily self-defeating and futile; but merely that the principle of Egoistic He-
donism, when applied with a due knowledge of the laws of human nature, is 
practically self-limiting.42 
 
                                                  
40 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 44, see also p. 51. 
41 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 44. 
42 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 136. 
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In other words, according to Sidgwick, the only conclusion that can be 
drawn from the “paradox” is that the same method to achieve the end to-
wards which egoism tends demands that to some extent we must place it 
outside our view and do not tend directly towards it. Once this danger has 
been clearly perceived it is no longer a cause of difficulty in the practical at-
tainment of hedonism. As Sidgwick says: 
 
For it is an experience only too common among men, in whatever pursuit 
they may be engaged, that they let the original object and goal of their ef-
forts pass out of view, and come to regard the means to this end as ends in 
themselves: so that they at last even sacrifice the original end to the at-
tainment of what is only secondarily and derivatively desirable. And if it be 
thus easy and common to forget the end in the means overmuch, there 
seems no reason why it should be difficult to do it to the extent that Ra-
tional Egoism prescribes […].43 
 
In Sidgwick’s view, more serious objections may be raised concerning the 
possibility of performing precisely and reliably the methodical calculation of 
pleasure and pain required in order to adopt the method of egoism. In the 
first instance, if pleasure exists only insofar as it is felt, the fundamental as-
sumption of egoism on the basis of which each pleasure has a quantitatively 
defined and measurable intensity must remain an a priori assumption that 
is not subject to any empirical verification. It is actually possible to assign a 
measure to a specific pleasure only when it is compared with other pleasur-
able sensations, but since this comparison can take place only in the imagi-
nation, it can only be hypothetically affirmed that, should it be possible for 
certain sensations to be felt simultaneously, it would be seen that one is 
more desirable than another in a definite proportion. 
Second, even if it is taken for granted that each of our pleasures and pains 
can be measured precisely, the problem remains of whether we are in a posi-
tion to know these quantities exactly. Indeed, even assuming we have an 
extraordinary predictive imagination, we would have to assume that during 
the measurement various different conditions were satisfied: 1) the mind 
would have to be in a perfectly neutral state in order to imagine all types of 
pleasure without bias for or against some specific sensation; 2) our capacity 
to enjoy certain specific pleasures must not change over time; 3) the assess-
ment of the hedonic value of a past sensation must not be subject to error; 
4) when we make use of the experience of others there must not be any dif-
ference between their sensitivity to the different types of pleasure and ours. 
 
                                                  
43 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 137. 
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3..3. The dualism of practical reason 
 
Sidgwick believed that the numerous critiques that may be made to egoism 
do not make up a sufficiently strong argument to refute this method. De-
spite the difficulties involved, people are able to calculate their own pleas-
ures accurately enough to satisfy the needs of their own lives. In fact, the 
strength of the normative reasons provided by egoism is never challenged 
by Sidgwick and it is precisely their universally binding nature that deter-
mines the failure of the foundational objectives of the Methods. In order to 
illustrate this point it must be borne in mind that Sidgwick, starting from 
the realization of the failure of “Mill’s test” in favour of utilitarianism, 
comes to the conclusion that it is necessary to follow a method that is the 
opposite of the inductive one. One of the principal themes developed by 
Sidgwick in his Methods of Ethics is the demonstration that the grasp of self-
evident first principles is essential for the rational foundation of utilitarian-
ism. The construction of the utilitarian principle requires explicit recourse 
to two self-evident axioms. These are necessary to account for the universal-
istic dimension of which its specific nature is composed. The term “univer-
salistic hedonism”, which Sidgwick frequently uses as a perfect synonym of 
“utilitarianism”, has the precise function of underlining this characteristic 
of universality. 
The two axioms are those referring to the “principle of reciprocity” and to 
the relationship between the part and the whole. The former of the two 
states that “whatever action any of us judges to be right for himself, he im-
plicitly judges to be right for all similar persons in similar circumstances”44. 
In other words, Sigdwick’s idea is that unless there are significant differ-
ences among the agents or in the circumstances of actions, the same conduct 
is both morally valid and universally binding. The second axiom is repre-
sented by a universalization of the principle of the “egoistic hedonism” ex-
amined in the previous section, in which the relationship between the part 
and the whole is applied “from the point of view of the Universe”45. In 
short, as the egoist will consider her individual goods from the point of view 
of her maximum overall good, so the universalist hedonist will view her own 
good and that of others “from the point of view of the universe”, from 
which the good of the single individual is important only insofar as it con-
                                                  
44 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 379. 
45 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 382. 
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tributes to the overall good produced in the universe. As Francesco Fagiani 
emphasized, in this view, “the overall goods of individuals appear as parts 
of a whole […] to which they are subordinate and in which, all contribu-
tions being equal, the identity of the individual source from which the in-
crease in the universal good comes is in no way significant”.46 
If, accepting Sidgwick’s proposal, we identify the good with the non 
moral value of “pleasure” or “happiness”, and if we accept the two self-
evident axioms, utilitarianism is fully founded. 
However, as Sidgwick himself points out quite “dramatically”, the second 
of the two axioms is actually made up of two principles, the second of which 
may be rationally rejected even if the first is accepted. The first principle by 
itself provides the foundation of the “rational egoism” theory; only the ac-
ceptance of the second principle, that is, the consideration of one’s own 
overall good as a part of the overall good of the universe, allows the egoistic 
dimension of ethics to be transcended by the universalistic one. 
Sidgwick concludes his Methods of Ethics by acknowledging the fact that 
no rational argument exists that is capable of convincing those who have 
accepted egoism to accept the utilitarian prescription.47 
Much of the contemporary discussion aimed at founding utilitarianism 
may be viewed as an attempt to come up with arguments that would allow, 
within the second axiom, to bridge the gap between the first and the second 
principle. Those who insist on the “separateness of persons” can only reject 
the second principle of the second axiom. Those who intend to develop 
Sidgwick’s project further would have to propose a radical reappraisal of the 
notion of person by defending a conception of personal identity that is much 
less compact than the traditional one. However, once we decide to follow 
this path we will be forced to reconsider the categorical distinction between 
prudence and altruism. The philosophical reflections of Derek Parfit will be 
decisive for this new direction. 
 
 
4. Derek Parfit’s “Self-interest Theory” 
 
Parfit describes his Self-interest or S Theory as a theory of individual ra-
tionality in which each individual is assigned the substantive objective of 
pursuing those outcomes that, given her set of desires, would allow her life 
                                                  
46 Francesco Fagiani, L’utilitarismo classico. Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick, Napoli, Liguori,  
1999, p. 53. 
47 In the final chapter of his Methods, Sidgwick affirms that the only possible way would 
be to postulate the existence of a utilitarian God who realizes the harmony between utili-
tarianism and prudence. 
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to unfold in the best possible way. In order to appreciate the peculiarity of 
this theory, it might be useful to imagine we could know all the desires of all 
persons – past, present and future. Moreover, each desire indicates both the 
person that has the desire and the time of her life in which it occurs (now, 
yesterday morning, in twenty years’ time). In view of the enormous quan-
tity of information involved, what would the rational course of action be? 
In other words, what desires should we take into greater account in deciding 
what to do? 
Theories of rationality have suggested different answers to these ques-
tions. For instance, they may disagree as to whether it is rational to con-
sider only our desires, or whether our future desires are to have the same 
weight as the present ones. The “Self-interest Theory” assigns significance 
only to the agent’s desires and deems that those of the others can only indi-
rectly influence the deliberative process that culminates in action. To use 
the technical jargon used in Reasons and Persons, this theory is agent-
relative (it assigns to each individual a different substantive aim). Each of 
one’s own desires directly provides the agent with a reason for acting and at 
any given moment the best rational action is dependent on the balancing of 
the relative weights of each of the reasons generated by those desires. 
In the wake of Sidgwick’s view of prudence, Parfit affirms that the force 
of these reasons is dependent exclusively on the intensity of the correspond-
ing desires and thus the time at which they are perceived has no influence: 
future desires, according to S theory, must in themselves have exactly the 
same weight as we assign to our present desires. In Parfit’s words, S is a 
temporally-neutral theory. Future events will be of less significance only if 
they are less likely to occur, but this does not mean that they are assigned 
less weight solely because, if they do take place, it will be later in time. 
Parfit believes that it is possible to conceive of three equally plausible 
versions of this theory which differently interpret the meaning of best out-
come. According to the “Hedonistic Theory”, for each individual the best 
outcome is the one that ensures the greatest happiness. The various versions 
of this theory put forward different conceptions of happiness and of the 
ways of measuring it. In accordance with the “Desire-Fulfilment Theory”, 
what is better for each individual is that which satisfies her desires through-
out his life. On the basis of the “Objective List Theory”, some things are 
good for us even if we do not desire them and bad for us even if we do not 
fear them. Different forms of this version exist according to what we con-
sider to be good or bad. 
These three theories coincide to a certain extent: they all agree in includ-
ing happiness and pleasure among the things that enhance our lives and un-
happiness and pain among those that worsen it. Without constraining him 
to choose among the three versions, this fact allows Parfit enormously to 
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simplify his treatment of “Self-interest Theory” by permitting him to dis-
cuss the “Hedonistic Theory” exclusively. 
 
 
4.1. How the “Self-interest Theory” may be self-defeating 
 
Parfit believes that numerous arguments may be constructed for the pur-
pose of testing the plausibility of a moral theory or a theory of rationality. 
Among these, the simplest consists in demonstrating that a theory is self-
defeating: this argument actually requires making no particular assump-
tions and in some cases is able to demonstrate that a theory fails on its own 
terms and must therefore be rejected. 
Nevertheless, in the case of many theories, being self-defeating is not the 
same as demonstrating that those theories are unacceptable or must be re-
jected. In some cases this argument simply shows that a theory needs to be 
revised or extended, while in others it is unable even to demonstrate such a 
weak conclusion. In this section we will examine the outcome of this argu-
ment in the case of the “Self-interest Theory” according to Parfit’s treat-
ment. It will be highlighted how, although S is self-defeating, this in no way 
signifies a negative outcome for this theory. 
In his article Prudence, Morality and Prisoner’s Dilemmas 48 and at greater 
length in the first part of Reasons and Persons, Parfit identifies four ways in 
which a theory may be self-defeating: 1) a theory T is “indirectly self-
defeating at the individual level” when it is true that, whenever someone at-
tempts to achieve the objectives assigned to him by T, the latter are actu-
ally achieved less well on the whole; 2) a theory T is directly self-defeating 
at the individual level whenever it is certain that, if a person successfully 
follows T (that is, he succeeds in performing the act that, among those 
available to him, he more successfully achieves the objectives assigned to 
him by T), by this very fact he will act in such a way that the objectives as-
signed to him by T are achieved less well than if it had not followed T suc-
cessfully; 3) a theory T is directly self-defeating at the collective level when-
ever it is certain that, if we all follow T successfully, for this very reason we 
will act in such a way that the objectives assigned to each one by T will be 
achieved less well than if none of us had successfully followed T; 4) a theory 
T is indirectly self-defeating at the collective level whenever it is true that, 
in the case that several persons follow the objectives proposed by T, those 
objectives are achieved less well. 
                                                  
48 Derek Parfit, Prudence, Morality and Prisoner’s Dilemma, “Proceedings of the British 
Academy” 65 (1979), pp. 539-64. 
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Since the “Self-interest Theory” is not a code of collective conduct, but a 
theory of individual rationality, the fact that it is indirectly or directly self-
defeating at the collective level cannot be considered an objection to it. Par-
fit thinks it is easy to demonstrate that the “Self-interest Theory” is indi-
rectly self-defeating at the individual level: for most people it is true that 
even if they never choose the line of action leading to a worse outcome, it 
would certainly be worse to be inclined to pursue one’s own interest exclu-
sively; it might be better to adopt another attitude. 
It is worth emphasizing that the attitude responsible for the objection 
should not be interpreted as a set of self-interested motives always encour-
aging purely egoistic actions. Parfit, like Butler and Sidgwick before him, 
stresses that it is possible to pursue one’s own personal interest by means of 
actions performed under the influence of altruistic motives or motives that 
are not directly self-interested: 
 
Suppose that I love my family and friends. On all of the theories people af-
fects what is in my interests. Much of my happiness comes from knowing 
about, and helping to cause, the happiness of those I love […]. Suppose that 
I know that, if I help you, this will be best for me. I may help you because I 
love you, not because I want to do what will be best for me.49 
 
Taking these explanations into account, Parfit believes that the best way 
to describe what it means for persons to have the attitude to pursue their 
personal interest is to affirm that, although often acting in pursuit of other 
more specific desires, they never do what they believe is worse for them. If 
this is true, these persons will explain themselves more clearly not by saying 
they have a disposition to pursue their own interest but by saying instead 
that they have the disposition never to go against it. 
Let us now describe how, for an individual who adopts this disposition, S 
may be indirectly self-defeating. This would happen whenever a person, 
without ever going against her own personal interest, suffered a worse out-
come than if she had adopted some other disposition. Even when persons 
succeed in never doing what is worse for them, the fact of never being will-
ing to sacrifice their own happiness could be worse. Changing their disposi-
tion could prove more advantageous for them. 
The following is one of Parfit’s better known examples. Kate is a writer. 
Her greatest desire is for her book to be successful. Since the quality of her 
book is so important for her, she loves her work and her life appears to smile 
at her. If her desire to write the book was weaker, her work would be boring 
and her life, on the whole, would be negatively affected. Nevertheless, Kate, 
                                                  
49 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 5-6. 
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under the effect of her strongest desire is led to work so frantically and for 
such long hours that she ends up feeling exhausted and sometimes very de-
pressed. As she is aware of this state of affairs, she is convinced that by 
working less frantically her book might be less successful but she would be 
happier, thus avoiding these periods of severe depression. If she accepts the 
“Self-interest Theory”, thereby acquiring the disposition not to go against 
her own interest, Kate will come round to the idea that she should not 
overwork as by so doing she would do herself harm. This is an obvious case 
in which S would be self-defeating. Indeed Kate would always be able to 
avoid working at such a frantic rate only by tempering the intensity of her 
desire. This would represent an even worse outcome in terms of personal in-
terest, since in this case work would be more boring for her and her life 
would be negatively affected. In Kate’s case it is therefore obvious that 
never sacrificing one’s own egoistic disposition can make things worse. 
In this example the “Self-interest Theory” is self-defeating in its hedonis-
tic version. If we were to accept the “Desire-Fulfilment Theory”, we could 
reject Kate’s idea that overwork is the cause of her problem: by working so 
hard, even though she wears herself out and occasionally suffers from de-
pression, she manages to improve her book’s quality. In this way, she en-
sures that her greatest desire is more fully satisfied. According to this “Self-
interest Theory” this is a more satisfactory outcome for her. 
For those who do not accept the hedonistic version of S, Parfit invents a 
different case. Let us imagine being lost in the desert and chancing to meet 
someone who can lead us back home in exchange for a certain sum of 
money. Let us imagine that we are unable to pay immediately, and that we 
promise to reward our rescuer as soon as we get home. Lastly, let us assume 
that we are transparent, that is, that we cannot lie without being caught. 
Since it would be worse for us to have to pay the agreed reward, if we know 
we are never willing to go against our own interest, we will never keep our 
promise to pay. Since we are transparent, also our would-be rescuer is also 
aware of this, and abandons us in the desert. For us it would have been bet-
ter to be trustworthy, that is, to have the disposition to keep our promise 
even when to do so would make matters worse. 
In the two cases described by Parfit, if an individual has the disposition 
of never going against her own interest, she makes the outcome worse. Par-
fit claims that this is true for most persons, for most of their lives. The ques-
tion is – does this mean that the S theory is intrinsically false? Is this a suf-
ficiently strong argument to reject the “Self-interest Theory”? 
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4.2. The “Self-interest Theory” is not intrinsically false 
 
The objection in question would be fatal to the “Self-interest Theory” if it 
prescribed that persons should adopt the disposition never to go against 
their own interest. However, this would be an unacceptable thesis. 
Parfit’s argument is constructed on three theses underpinning the “Self-
interest Theory”. S claims that “for each person, there is one supremely ra-
tional ultimate aim: that his life go, for him, as well as possible” (thesis S1). 
When applied to acts, S claims both that each of us has most reason to do 
whatever would be best for himself (thesis S2) and that is irrational for any-
one to do what he believes will be worse for himself (thesis S3). From the 
above three propositions a fourth thesis may be derived concerning the ra-
tionality of dispositions, that is, the set of motives that the “Self-interest 
Theory” prescribes that each agent should adopt. The fourth thesis claims 
that each agent should try to have or seek to maintain the best possible mo-
tives in terms of self-interest, that is this set of dispositions about which it 
may be affirmed that there is no other one that is better for her to have 
(thesis S4). 
It is sometimes very difficult to know whether a set of motives may be 
causally possible, or whether it is one of the best in terms of S. Parfit never-
theless claims that there are also many cases in which a person knows that it 
would be better for her if her motives were to undergo some change: for such 
persons it may be true, as has emerged in the two preceding cases, that 
never to be willing to sacrifice one’s self interest can lead to worse outcomes. 
Furthermore, in cases in which the person knows how to produce such 
changes, the thesis S3 implies that for these persons it would be irrational 
not to produce it, and that it would instead be rational to seek to have an-
other disposition. 
What these sets of motives actually are is partly a question of fact and 
the details of the response differ according to the different persons and the 
different circumstances of their lives: what we know in advance is only that 
it would be better for some persons if they were occasionally to go against 
their own interest and were willing to do what is worse for them. The limit-
ing case is that in which for a person, under certain circumstances, it would 
be better to try and become completely irrational.50 
Parfit claims that the “Self-interest Theory”, although not intrinsically 
false, may nevertheless be refuted by means of an argument that challenges 
its very rationality. Before reconstructing this objection let us examine the 
conception of personal identity on which it is based. 
                                                  
50 See the well-known case of Schelling’s Answer to Armed Robbery in Derek Parfit, Rea-
sons and Persons,pp. 12-13. 
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4.3. Derek Parfit’s personal identity theory 
 
In this section a brief outline is given of the central elements of the discus-
sion of personal identity which makes up part three of Reasons and Persons. 
The essential arguments of Parfit’s conception largely follow in the wake of 
the theses illustrated in numerous previous articles, and in particular those 
of his well-known article Personal Identity(1971).51 
The two polemical objectives in that article, the thesis that personal iden-
tity is perfectly determined (the questions bearing on the identity of persons 
allow of only “yes or no” answers) and that according to which “what 
counts” when survival is at stake is personal identity itself, actually repre-
sent the central focus of the comprehensive discussion in Reasons and Per-
sons. 
Parfit claims that our view of the nature of persons and their continuing 
existence over time can be schematically presented as two theses: 1) persons 
are individual and ontologically non -reducible facts, whose continuing exis-
tence over time does not depend on (that is, it is not made up of) the exis-
tence of empirical, physical or psychological facts. From this it may be in-
ferred as a corollary that the existence of the same person in two different 
times is a fact that is always perfectly determinable. 2) The continuing exis-
tence of these individual entities, that is, their numerical identity, is “what 
counts” when we are considering questions involving our survival. Numeri-
cal identity is the only thing that can justify the special interest we have in 
our existence and our future well-being. 
Using a surprisingly large number of procedures, Parfit endeavours to 
demonstrate that what we are inclined to believe is not what we should be-
lieve because common sense has “a false view of the nature of personal iden-
tity”52. As an heir to that antisubstantialist tradition that had its first de-
fender in Locke and in Hume its strenuous supporter, Parfit is defending a 
reductionistic or complex theory of personal identity which aims at reducing 
any discourse on the nature of persons to a description of the relations 
among classes of mental states that can be described “impersonally”, 
thereby eliminating all forms of reference to subjectivity, to the point of 
view of the first person. He consequently puts forward a criterion of per-
sonal identity according to which our continuing existence consists in the 
recurrence of a relation of psychological connectedness and/or continuity 
among states of consciousness (“Relation R”). 
                                                  
51 Derek Parfit, Personal Identity, “Philosophical Review” 53 (1971), pp. 3-27. 
52 See Derek Parfit, Lewis, Perry and the Matters, in A.O. Rorty, The Identities of Persons, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1976, pp. 91-107. See also Derek Parfit, Reasons 
and Persons, chap. 10. 
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As it will be attempted to explain in the following sections, two highly 
innovative theses are implied in Parfit’s conception. In the first place, the 
fact that the psychological connectedness is a relation that allows of varia-
tions in intensity means that it is also possible for cases in which our iden-
tity is indeterminate to occur. In the second place, if this thesis is accepted, 
it must be assumed that it is the relation of continuity and psychological 
connection between my present states and the future ones rather than per-
sonal identity per se what justifies the special interest in our future well-
being. 
Parfit’s proposal has been interpreted as one of the most radical attempts 
ever made to eliminate the subject-person from the basic elements of the 
world. This contributed to making Parfit’s reflections an essential point of 
reference both for those participating in the analytical debate who are inter-
ested in the general image of the person and for those involved in the discus-
sion on the criteria of personal identity. It must be stated from the outset, 
however, that these two lines of reflection concerning Parfit, from our point 
of view, take on a significant, albeit limited, role. This is because our main 
interest lies not so much in the discussion of the nature of the person or in 
the way in which an answer to this question accounts for the thousand and 
one puzzles of personal identity, but rather in the consequences that Parfit’s 
theory of personal identity has on the classical theory of prudence. 
Parfit actually claims that close relations exist among the nature of per-
sons and their identity over time and our reasons for acting. Once our 
shared opinions concerning personal identity have been changed we must 
consequently modify some of our beliefs concerning what we have most rea-
son to do: we must reappraise out beliefs concerning rationality. 
 
 
4.4. Locke’s legacy: the psychological criterion of personal identity 
 
The contemporary debate on personal identity is often characterized as re-
ferring to the principles which allow us to establish, for instance, that the 
person appearing before us is the same as the one we previously knew, where 
the principles sought must not be understood as mere pragmatic criteria (as, 
for instance, when the identity of a subject is established using his finger-
prints), but refer to the justification of our identification procedures. As 
emphasized by Harold W. Noonan, it is possible in this connection to speak 
of the “logically necessary and sufficient conditions for which a person iden-
tified at a given moment is the same person as that identified at another”53. 
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that in this kind of investigation it is im-
                                                  
53 Harold Noonan, Personal Identity, London, Routledge,1989, p. 2. 
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portant to explicitly state the link between the search for such criteria and 
the more general, but no less exacting, question referring to the nature of 
the person. As Derek Parfit correctly points out we are confronted with two 
closely related issues: 1) What is a person’s nature? 2) What is it that makes 
a person at two different moments one and the same person, or more pre-
cisely what is it that necessarily implies the continuing existence of each 
person over time? 
Parfit claims that an answer to the second question is at least in part an 
answer to the first: the necessary characteristics of our continuing existence 
over time actually depend on our nature. In our examination of Parfit’s po-
sition, for the sake of the explanation we shall not follow the order dictated 
by the logical priority of these questions but will deal with the nature of the 
persons after having answered the question of what is implied by their con-
tinuing existence over time. 
Parfit defends a particularly sophisticated version of what in the contem-
porary debate is commonly defined as a psychological criterion. In very gen-
eral terms, this conception states that personal identity implies the continu-
ity of memory. This idea seems prima facie plausible because, it is claimed, it 
is precisely memory which makes most people aware of their own continuing 
existence. 
The origins of this conception may be traced back to John Locke who, in 
Chap. XXVII of Book II of his Essay concerning Human Understanding, in 
several pithy pages, addresses what some believe may be considered the first 
comprehensive discussion concerning the criteria of personal identity which 
allow one to speak of a unitary subject that is continuous over time. For 
Locke the only fact that counts is the existence of direct memory connec-
tions, that is, memories of past experiences.54 Parfit partly modified this 
Lockean conception. First of all, he considers that should no memory con-
nections exist between two persons, let us say, between X today and Y 
twenty years ago, a continuity of memory may subsist just the same. This 
would be the case when a chain of linked memories exists between X and Y. 
This is a fairly frequent occurrence for the majority of people: every day 
they have memories of experiences they had the day before. It thus seems 
plausible to imagine that one of the conditions to be able to affirm that two 
persons at different times are the same person is that continuity of memory 
exists between them. Secondly, Parfit claims that the Lockean conception 
                                                  
54 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), edited with an intro-
duction by Peter H. Nidditch, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975. For a detailed discussion 
on the influence of Locke's seminal ideas on the contemporary debate on the self, see 
Raymond Martin & John Barresi (ed.), The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual 
History of Personal Identity, New York, Columbia University Press, 2006. 
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would however have to be corrected so as to take into account other psycho-
logical facts. As well as memories there are also other forms of direct psy-
chological connection that necessarily have some weight in a personal iden-
tity criterion, such as desires, beliefs that are conserved over time, the con-
nection linking an intention to the subsequent action in which it is imple-
mented, salient features of a character, etc. Parfit terms all these kinds of 
direct psychological links “psychological connections”. 
Once Parfit modified the Lockean position along these lines, he places at 
the centre of his psychological criterion the relation of psychological conti-
nuity. Parfit defines this fundamental relation as the occurrence of chains of 
strong psychological connections. Here strong is meant to signify the exis-
tence of connections that are acceptable on average; for instance, an adult 
person might be called upon each day to recall at least 50% of the previous 
day’s experiences, and so on for all the other types of psychological connec-
tions mentioned above. 
Psychological continuity, unlike psychological connection, is a transitive 
relation and may therefore represent the personal identity criterion over 
time. This enables us to formulate the “psychological criterion” of Parfit’s 
personal identity: (1) “psychological continuity” exists only when there are 
linked chains of strong connections. X today is the same person as Y in a 
previous moment only if (2) X is in psychological continuity with Y. (3) per-
sonal identity over time consists precisely in the occurrence of facts like (2). 
 
 
4.5. The “Reductionist” conception of personal identity 
 
According to Parfit’s psychological criterion, personal identity over time 
merely implies different types of psychological continuity. Parfit affirms 
that this conception may be considered as a “Reductionist” theory of per-
sonal identity. In the latter the fact of the identity of a person over time, 
that is, her continuing existence, is deemed to consist solely in the occur-
rence of simpler, i.e. psychological, facts. These facts may be described in an 
impersonal way, that is without explicitly affirming that these were the ex-
periences of a specific person. In other words, it is possible to describe all the 
psychological facts characterizing the mental life of a person in purely ob-
jective terms, in the third person, thereby eliminating all references to a 
first-person point of view. 
Opposed to this theory are the “Non-Reductionist” conceptions of per-
sonal identity. In their stronger version they affirm that personal identity 
over time does not consist solely in physical and/or psychological continu-
ity: it is an additional fact, distinct from the latter. It consists in the exis-
tence of a spiritual substance, a simple purely mental entity that accounts 
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for both the unity of consciousness in the various moments in time and the 
unity of a life as a whole. 
In the “Reductionist” conception, persons are merely sets of experiences 
made up of relations of direct “psychological continuity” or by weaker 
forms of connection. In accordance with Parfit’s well-known metaphor, they 
resemble clubs: entities that exist in a certain sense, but which are not in-
cluded among the substantial elements of the world, as entities character-
ized by being centres of experience, but which are completely exhausted in 
the individuals that constitute them. 
If we are seeking an example of the ontological depotentiation of the sub-
ject, suffice it to examine Parfit’s description of dying, which seems to re-
semble more closely the break-up of a meeting than the irreparable loss of 
something. For Parfit: “Instead of saying, ‘I shall be dead’, I should say, 
‘There will be no future experiences that will be related, in certain ways, to 
these present experiences’”55. 
 
 
4.6. “Reductionist” thesis: “what matters” is not personal identity 
 
Within the framework of neurobiological and neuropsychological research, 
the results of the clinical examinations performed on patients suffering from 
different types of disorder seem to cast doubts on the conventional image of 
ourselves as unitary and continuous entities. The conflict between the phi-
losophical considerations triggered by several clinical cases and the common 
sense intuitions concerning the self is a topic that receives extensive treat-
ment in part three of Reasons and Persons. According to Parfit’s interpreta-
tion, the forms of “dissociation of consciousness” believed to take place in 
the case of so called “split brains”, those in which the connections between 
the cerebral hemispheres have been surgically severed, provide strong ar-
guments in favour of his reductionist conception. They are deemed to dem-
onstrate that “what matters”, that is, what justifies the special interest we 
feel in our future, is not personal identity but the relation of psychological 
continuity and/or connection (relation R). 
Parfit imagines a radical case of ramification of the streams of conscious-
ness in which the brain of an individual A is split and transplanted into that 
of his two brothers B and C. The latter will have a relation of complete psy-
chological continuity with their donor. Both of them, after waking up after 
the operation, will believe they are the dead brother: they will have the im-
pression of remembering having lived his life, will have his same desires and 
his same intentions. 
                                                  
55 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 281. 
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In this imaginary case, “Relation R” (“psychological connectedness” 
and/or “psychological continuity”) is configured as a bifurcation. However, 
personal identity cannot take on this form. The donor and his two brothers, 
thus constituted, cannot be the same person. Since the donor cannot be the 
same as two different persons, and since it would be arbitrary to say that 
only one of the two brothers is the same as the first one, the best way of de-
scribing this case is to say that neither person is A. 
Unlike ordinary cases, in which personal identity is merely the occurrence 
of “Relation R” (indeed in practically all real cases R takes on the form of a 
one-to-one relation: that is, it exists between a person who currently exists 
and a future person), these are cases in which “psychological continuity” 
and “psychological connectedness” exist without identity. 
The question might thus be asked of whether the lack of identity is really 
so important. Parfit’s answer is negative: what really counts is the “Rela-
tion R” whatever its cause (in normal cases the persistence of the “Relation 
R” is guaranteed by the continuity of the central nervous system, which is 
indeed the natural cause). 
Parfit illustrates this point by discussing an imaginary story. Let us 
imagine that a ‘Star Trek’ science-fiction-like device is used to scan my body 
and break it up into its component parts and then sends a signal to Mars by 
means of which a body identical to the original is recomposed. Subjectively 
speaking what happens is this: I press a button on Earth and immediately 
find myself on Mars. Assuming total psychological continuity I could say 
that the individual recomposed on Mars is identical to my self on Earth. Let 
us imagine, however, that a second copy of myself is sent to Saturn. For the 
reasons given above it is no longer possible to assert that I am identical to 
the individual sent to Mars. On the other hand, it is easy to believe that this 
lack of identity does not count for very much: after all, the situation is the 
same as before with the addition of a third person on Saturn. A few prob-
lems could conceivably arise because of the split (quarrels over possessions, 
love for the same wife, etc.) although, according to Parfit, the type of sur-
vival that I am guaranteed by psychological continuity in the ramified case 
is what I ought to assign value to. 
If we accept Parfit’s “psychological criterion”, each ramification corre-
sponds to the death of an individual A and the birth of two “Parfitian 
heirs”, B and C, in his place, neither of whom is identical to A. But as Di 
Francesco rightly points out, this is a death in which no one actually dies: 
“the subject is actually not an added value vis-à-vis the continuity of the 
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experience and if the latter persists (albeit is multiplied), we have no reason 
to complain of the loss of anything real”56. 
 
 
4.7. Refutation of the classical theory of prudence 
 
Now I shall present a comprehensive treatment of the argument by means 
of which Parfit believes it is possible to refute the “Self-interest Theory”. 
In S the “requirement of equal concern” is fundamental: a rational person 
ought to have equal concern for all parts of his own future. This means that 
each of us may attribute less importance to what may happen in the future 
only if this remoteness makes the event less probable. According to Parfit 
this thesis may be challenged on the basis of the reductionist conception. As 
emphasized in the preceding section, on the basis of Parfit’s position, what 
fundamentally matters is psychological continuity and/or connectedness. In 
more than one point Parfit reiterates that both these relations play an im-
portant role in determining the special interest we attribute to our future. 
With these premises in mind, Parfit states a general thesis: 
 
(C) My concern for my future may correspond to the degree of connected-
ness between me now and myself in the future. Connectedness is one of the 
two relations that give me reasons to be specially concerned about my own 
future. It can be rational to care less, when one of the grounds for caring will 
hold to a lesser degree. Since connectedness is nearly always weaker over 
longer periods, I can rationally care less about my further future.57 
 
It should be noted that Parfit defends a discount rate referring not to 
time but to the attenuation of one of the two relations making up what has 
fundamental importance. Unlike the discount rate referring to time, this 
new discount rate is unlikely to be valid for the near future. 
According to Parfit we must accept the thesis (C). Even if there are some 
exceptions, numerous relations must be judged less important when they 
occur with reduced levels of intensity: friendship, complicity, kinship, re-
sponsibility are but a few of the possible examples. Psychological connect-
edness must be considered in a like fashion. If we accept (C) we are rejecting 
the requirement of equal concern. This requirement is central to the “Self-
interest Theory” and so we must reject this theory. 
                                                  
56 Michele Di Francesco, L’io e i suoi sé. Identità personale e scienza della mente, Milano, 
Raffaello Cortina Editore, 1998, p. 195. 
57 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 313. 
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Parfit imagines that a defender of the theory S could retort that it is pos-
sible to modify the theory in question in such a way as to take his objection 
into account by incorporating a discount rate referring to psychological 
connectedness. According to this revised version, the dominant interest of a 
rational being ought to be that referring to her own future, although at that 
moment she might have less interest in those parts of her future with which 
she currently has a less close connection. 
Parfit counters this response by arguing that this revised theory could 
not be considered a version of the “Self-interest Theory”. Indeed the revised 
theory severs the fundamental link between S and the person’s good on the 
whole. In the previous sections it has been shown how a central characteris-
tic of the various formulations of the classical theory of prudence is that it is 
irrational for anyone not to do what she believes to be her good on the 
whole. In the revised theory, on the other hand, this thesis would have to be 
abandoned: if it is not irrational to be less concerned with certain parts of 
one’s own future, it may not be irrational to do what is deemed worse in re-
lation to one’s own good on the whole. 
As can be seen from the latter statement, the reply by the defender of S 
cannot be accepted and Parfit’s objection is still decisive. 
 
 
4.8. The immorality of imprudence 
 
The outcome of Parfit’s argument against the “Self-interest Theory” shows 
that it is no longer possible, as required by classical theory, to consider im-
prudent actions as irrational, since prudence cannot be equated with practi-
cal rationality. This means not having any more philosophical arguments to 
criticize imprudent actions. As Parfit affirms: 
 
If we believe that an imprudent act is not irrational, the charge ‘imprudent’ 
will cease, for many people, to be a criticism. It will become merely descrip-
tive, in the way that, for many, ‘unchaste’ is merely a description.58 
 
It therefore becomes necessary to seek a new theory that, by using a cri-
terion other than rationality, will enable us to censure imprudent actions. 
Parfit suggests modifying our moral theory in such a way as to extend its 
application also to those actions that, in the past, were not the primary ob-
ject of moral evaluation. 
                                                  
58 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 318. 
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In this perspective, Parfit believes two different strategies may be pur-
sued. He limits himself to describing them in very general terms, without 
actually choosing between them. 
The first proposal consists of an appeal to consequentialism, and in par-
ticular to an agent-neutral principle of beneficence. If, in order to obtain 
lesser benefits in the present, an individual acts in such a way as to obtain 
greater hardship in her old age, she acts in a way that, when considered im-
partially, is the cause of worse consequences as it increases the quantity of 
suffering in the world, in accordance with this line of argument it may thus 
be affirmed that this individual acts in a morally deplorable way as her im-
prudence makes the outcome worse. As Parfit claims in Reasons an Persons, 
from the impartial perspective of consequentialism, “it is no excuse that the 
outcome will be worse only for me”59. 
Conversely, the second strategy consists in extending that part of moral 
theory that is “agent- relative”. This involves our special obligations to-
wards those with whom we have special relations: those with children, par-
ents, patients, clients, are only few examples. It could be affirmed, Parfit 
goes on to say, that the relation between me in the present and me in the fu-
ture sets up similar special obligations. 
Parfit is aware that a revision of our moral conception in one of these two 
ways “would be, for many people, a large change in their conception of mo-
rality”, since it seems to be a very deep common belief in our shared ethical 
thinking that “it cannot be a moral matter how one affects one’s one fu-
ture”60. However, if we accept a complex and reductionist account of the 
self this is the only strategy available. From this perspective we can no 
longer maintain that there is a categorical distinction between the way our 
actions affect our future self and the way they affect other selves. The only 
reasons that apply to these situations are the moral ones. 
                                                  
59 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 319. 
60 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 319. 
